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WAKE.UP CALL: USING THE WASHINGTON
SHORELINE MANAGEMENT ACT TO PROTECT THE
SHORELINES OF PUGET SOUND FROM HIGH-SPEEDVESSEL WAKE WASH
Cory J. Albright
Abstract: Wake wash from high-speed vessels such as the Chinook passenger ferry
accelerates erosion, destroys kelp and shellfish beds, and endangers recreational boaters in
Puget Sound. The Washington Shoreline Management Act (SMA) grants the Washington
State Department of Ecology (DOE) and local governments authority to regulate water uses in
order to protect the shoreline environment. The federal Coastal Zone Management Act echoes
this policy and mandates federal-state cooperation in the development and protection of the
coastal zone. Although the U.S. Coast Guard traditionally regulates vessel traffic in Puget
Sound pursuant to Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the Coast Guard has failed
to protect shorelines from the adverse environmental impacts of vessel wake wash. This
Comment argues that the DOE and local governments should construe the SMA to authorize
the regulation of vessel speed in Puget Sound to protect ecologically sensitive shorelines from
destructive wake wash. This argument finds support in the text of the SMA, interpretations of
its scope, the language and legislative history of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act,
and the coastal zone management programs of other states. This Comment concludes that
federal preemption rules protecting states' interests in fulfilling peculiar environmental needs
suggest that Coast Guard speed regulations should not preempt vessel-speed regulations
promulgated by the DOE and local governments pursuant to the SMA.

"The local community is more likely competent than the federal
government to tailor environmental regulations to the ecological
sensitivities ofaparticulararea ... "
The deployment of the Chinook high-speed passenger ferry has been
highly controversial because high-speed-vessel wake wash2 threatens the
shoreline environment of Puget Sound by causing erosion, destroying
critical kelp and shellfish beds, and imperiling recreational boaters.' In
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,493 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. Wake wash consists principally of two sets of wave patterns that emanate diagonally from a
vessel's bow, stem, or both. See generally Danish Maritime Auth., The Environmental Impact of
High-Speed Ferries,Seaways, Oct. 1998, at 9-10.
3. See Washington State Transp. Comm'n, Puget Sound Passenger-Only Ferry Program
Implementation Plan: Technical Appendix 3-4 (1993) [hereinafter Implementation Plan]; see also
Wash. Admin. Code § 365.190.080(5) (1999) (designating kelp and shellfish beds in Puget Sound as
critical saltwater habitats demanding special attention); Danish Maritime Auth., supra note 2, at 913 (addressing adverse impact of high-speed ferry wake wash on small vessels, shoreline animal and
plant life, and erosion processes); Magnus Ostman & Olaf R6nnberg, Effects of Ships' Waves on
Rock-Pools in the Aland Archipelago, Northern Baltic Sea, 76 Sarsia 125, 129-31 (1991) (finding
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May 1998, Washington State Ferries thrilled commuters when it
introduced the $8.7 million Chinook, reducing the Bremerton-Seattle

commute from one hour to thirty minutes.' Kitsap County5 developers
and Bremerton city officials celebrated the investment stimulated by the
introduction of the Chinook.6 However, property owners along Rich
Passage, a narrow channel extending from Bremerton to Orchard Point
through which the Chinook traveled, soon complained that the Chinook's
wake wash was eroding their shorelines, damaging their bulkheads,
carrying away shellfish, and destroying kelp beds.' In March 1999, they
filed suit seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages.8

While population and economic growth have fueled the demand for
high-speed vessels worldwide,9 scientists and naval architects are still
learning how to measure and mitigate the strength of high-speed-vessel

that biomass and number of algae and invertebrate species were reduced on high-speed ferry routes);
Nigel Warren, Wash-A Nuisance on Crowded Waterways, Ship & Boat Int'l, July-Aug. 1987, at 44
(observing that wake wash erodes valuable river banks and overturns rowing craft).
4. See David Schaefer, Chinook: A Ferry That Feels Airborne, Seattle Times, May 16, 1998, at
A 1. See generally Larry Lange, House PanelAdds Budget Requestfor Fast Car Ferry, Seattle PostIntelligencer, Mar. 16, 1999, at BI (discussing Washington State Ferries plan to deploy six
additional high-speed passenger ferries and to budget for high-speed car ferry).
5. The City of Bremerton, Washington, is in Kitsap County.
6. See Larry Lange, Ferries Churn Up Opposition in Rich Passage, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Oct. 5, 1998, at B3.
7. See First Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
at 13-18, Kucera v. Washington State Dep't of Transp., No. 99-2-011611 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 12,
1999) [hereinafter Complaint]; Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Reconsider the
Court's Injunction at 12, Kucera v. Washington State Dep't of Transp., No. 99-2-011611 (Wash.
Super. Ct. May 12, 1999) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (concluding that Chinook's wake
damaged clam and other invertebrate communities, non-adaptable barnacle communities, and macroalgae communities, all of which are part of habitat for threatened Chinook juvenile salmon); see also
Lange, supra note 6, at B3. The Chinook's degradation of threatened juvenile salmon habitat might
also subject the Washington State Department of Transportation to scrutiny under the Endangered
Species Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1533(d), 1538(a)(1)(B), (G) (1994); 64 Fed. Reg. 60,727,
60,731 (1999).
8. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 24-25. See generally George Foster & Larry Lange,
Washington Knew Denmark'sFast Ships Caused Wakes, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1999, at
AI (finding that government authorities have studied and slowed high-speed ferries in Maine and
British Columbia due to property owners' complaints of beach erosion, dock damage, and threats to
recreational boaters, swimmers, and marine life).
9. There is a growing international market for high-speed freight vessels, passenger ferries, and
car ferries. See, e.g., Container Shipping Indus., High Speed Cargo Ships (visited Mar. 25, 2000)
<http://www.containershipping.comlinfo/newreports.html>;
Jane's Corp., Janes High-Speed
Marine Transportation (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <http://www.janes.com/transport/news
trannewsjhsmt contentf.html>.

Washington Shoreline Management Act
wake wash.

°

In 1993, Washington State Ferries recognized that

ecological sensitivity in Puget Sound consisted principally of sensitivity
to vessel wake wash." It concluded that wake-wash energy in Rich
Passage "should be held to a value that is relatively imperceptible to the

ecosystem" to prevent erosion and the destruction of kelp and shellfish
beds." Although Washington State Ferries attempted to incorporate a
"no-harm" wake-wash standard into the Chinook's design, subsequent

undisputed studies revealed that in operation the Chinook's wake wash
exceeded this standard. 3 In August 1999, the Kitsap County Superior

Court ordered Washington State Ferries to slow the Chinook from thirtyfive to twelve knots in Rich Passage and to prepare an environmental
impact statement documenting the effect of the Chinook's wake wash on
the shoreline environment. 4
This Comment argues that despite the U.S. Coast Guard's traditional

jurisdiction over vessel traffic, the Washington State Department of
Ecology (DOE) and local governments should construe the Washington
Shoreline Management Act (SMA) to authorize the regulation of vessel
speed to protect the shoreline ecology of Puget Sound from destructive
vessel wake wash.' 5 Part I provides an overview of the SMA and judicial
10. See Gordy Holt, An UplifingIdea: Clallam County Boat BuildersSay They Have a Solution
for Chinook's Wake Problem, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 16, 1999, at BI; Larry Lange, State
Will Try to Foil Ferry's Unruly Waves, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 12, 1999, at B1 (discussing
structural strategies offered by naval architects to reduce Chinook's wake wash). See generally
Danish Maritime Auth., supra note 2, at 9-13; Mats H. Feldtmann, High Speed Sea Operationsnear
Sensitive Shorelines (1998) (on file with author); Warren, supranote 3, at 44.
11. See Implementation Plan,supranote 3, at 3-23.
12. Id
13. See Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13, 21, Kucera v.
Washington State Dep't of Transp., No. 99-2-011611 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 12, 1999).
14. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 7-8, Kucera v.
Washington State Dep't of Transp., No. 99-2-011611 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 12, 1999). The court
concluded that Washington State Ferries failed to comply with the State Environmental Policy Act.
See id.at 6-7. Thirty-five knots equals approximately 41 miles (65 kilometers) per hour, 12 knots
equals approximately 14 miles (22 kilometers) per hour. The court apparently chose the 12 knot
speed limit because this is the speed to which Washington State Ferries voluntarily slowed its newly
deployed passenger-only ferries in 1990 after Rich Passage property owners complained of wakewash damage. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 11; Implementation Plan, supra note 3, at 4. On
March 16, 2000, the Supreme Court of Washington dissolved this preliminary injunction. See
Kucera v. Washington State Dep't of Transp., 140 Wash. 2d 200, 995 P.2d 63, 76 (2000).
15. The DOE and local governments might employ an alternative strategy by promulgating
shoreline wake-wash energy standards that no vessel's wake would be permitted to exceed.
Although this exercise of state police power-directly regulating an environmental condition rather
than vessels-may be slightly less vulnerable to federal preemption, this strategy poses major
enforcement difficulties because scientific measures of wake wash remain imprecise. See, e.g.,
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interpretation of its scope, the federal Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), and Coast Guard authority over vessel speed pursuant to Title I
of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA). Part II discusses states'
roles in regulating navigation and the preemption of state regulations by
federal regulations in this field of concurrent jurisdiction. Part III argues
that the DOE and local governments should interpret the SMA to allow
the regulation of vessel speed. The text of the SMA, administrative and
judicial interpretations of its scope, the language and legislative history
of the CZMA, and other states' regulation of vessels pursuant to their
coastal zone management programs support this argument. Finally, Part
IV demonstrates why Coast Guard vessel-speed regulations should not
preempt local vessel-speed regulations that address peculiar environmental concerns. This Comment concludes that to protect the shoreline
environment of Puget Sound from high-speed-vessel wake wash, the
DOE and local governments should construe the SMA to authorize the
regulation of vessel speed and that Coast Guard regulations would not
preempt these regulations.
I.

THE ROLES OF WASHINGTON AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND
VESSEL REGULATION

The Washington Shoreline Management Act (SMA)"6 authorizes the
Washington State Department of Ecology (DOE) and local governments
to regulate activities in the shoreline environment. 7 The federal Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) 18 creates incentives for states to exercise
greater control over their coastal zones 9 through management plans such
Danish Maritime Auth., Technical Investigation of Wake Wash from Fast Ferries11 (1996); Warren,
supra note 3, at 44. Also, advocates in the high-speed-vessel industry argue that new vessel
architectural designs rather than speed limits are the appropriate solution to wake-wash problems.
See Warren, supra note 3, at 44; Optimar, Inc., Minimizing Wake Wash (visited Mar. 25, 2000)
<http://www.optimar.com/wake.html>. While this Comment does not dispute this argument,
regulating vessel speed is the most direct and immediate way to protect shoreline ecology.
16. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.010-.930 (1998); see also Wash. Admin. Code §§ 173-16-010 to
-27-990 (1999).
17. See generally Geoffrey Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49
Wash. L. Rev. 423 (1974).
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994); see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.1-930.145 (1999).
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (defining coastal zone as "waters (including the lands... thereunder)

and the adjacent shorelands"); see also 15 C.F.R. § 923.32 (defining water area to include state's
internal waters and setting seaward boundary at three nautical miles, outer limit of state title and
ownership under Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994)).

Washington Shoreline Management Act
as the SMA.2 ° Yet federal jurisdiction over vessels and navigation

remains deeply rooted in federal law. Most relevant to this Comment is
Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA),2" which grants
authority to the U.S. Coast Guard to regulate vessel speed.
A.

The Washington ShorelineManagementAct of 1971

The SMA provides for the protection and responsible development of
Washington's shorelines. Local governments implement the SMA

through locally administered programs designed to address local
environmental needs. The Supreme Court of Washington has broadly
construed the regulatory scope of these local programs, and the SMA
recognizes the potential overlap of these programs with the jurisdiction

of federal agencies.
1.

Policy Mandatesand Jurisdictionof the SMA
In 1971, the Washington legislature enacted the SMA?2 to respond to

concerns of both public environmental interests and private property
developers.' The legislature recognized the need to restore, preserve,
and protect shoreline environments through coordinated federal, state,
and local shoreline management.24 The legislature made the Washington

20. The SMA largely comprises Washington's federally approved coastal zone management
program. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-27-060 (1999); see also Skokomish Indian Tribe v.
Fitzsimmons, 97 Wash. App. 84, 86 n.1, 982 P.2d 1179, 1181 n.1 (1999); Washington Dep't of
Ecology, Shoreline Management Guidebook M-5, M-10 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Shoreline
Management Guidebook] (noting that CZMA covers only 15 Washington counties that border
saltwater counties on Pacific coast and bordering Puget Sound).
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1994); see also 33 C.F.R. §§ 160.1-167.350 (1999).
22. Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 1971 Wash. Laws, Ex. Sess., ch. 286, §§ 141 (codified as amended in Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.010-.930 (1998)). In November 1972,
Washington voters approved the SMA when it appeared on the ballot alongside Initiative 43, the
Seacoast Management Initiative Bill. See 5Op. Wash. State Att'y Gen. (1977).
23. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020 (1998).
24. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020; see also Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co.,
89 Wash. 2d 203, 214, 571 P.2d 196, 202 (1977) (referring to SMA as "statute of general
application" for environmental protection). But see Batchelder v. City of Seattle, 77 Wash. App. 154,
159, 890 P.2d 25, 29 (1995) (referring to SMA as "zoning code").
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State Department of Ecology (DOE) responsible for implementing and
enforcing the SMAY
The SMA has two principal policy objectives.26 First, the SMA
protects land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and aquatic life by ensuring
that permitted shoreline uses minimize ecological damage.27 For
example, the SMA mandates strict regulation of types and intensities of
activities that degrade the value of the shoreline environment or cause
erosion.28 Second, the SMA protects navigational rights by minimizing
any interference with the public use of the water.29 One way the SMA
accomplishes this objective is by requiring that aquaculture activities in
Puget Sound be designed and regulated to avoid interference with
navigation." The SMA contains a clause mandating that the Act be
"liberally construed to give full effect to the objectives and purposes for
which it was enacted." 3 1
The SMA covers both land and water areas. With limited exceptions,
the Act defines "shorelines" as all water areas of the state, their
underlying lands, and associated wetlands.32 In marine waters, the
33
jurisdiction of the SMA extends to all inland waters and coastal waters
three miles seaward from the coast.34 The landward jurisdiction of the
SMA extends 200 feet from the ordinary high-water mark of each body
of water.
The SMA requires the DOE to protect and manage 36 the waters of
Puget Sound seaward from the line of extreme low tide because these

25. See Wash. Rev. Code §90.58.300 (1998). The regulations promulgated by the DOE are
compiled in the Washington Administrative Code. See Wash. Admin. Code §§ 173-16-010 to -27990 (1999).
26. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020.
27. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020.
28. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-040.
29. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020(a)(i).
30. See Wash. Admin. Code § 176-16-060(2).
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.900 (1998); see also Buechel v. Department of Ecology, 125
Wash. 2d 196, 203, 884 P.2d 910, 915 (1994).
32. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(2)(d) (1998).
33. The SMA does not define inland waters or coastal waters.
34. See Shoreline ManagementGuidebook, supranote 20, at M-13.
35. See id at M-24.
36. See Wash. Rev. Code

§§

90.58.020, .060 (1998).

Washington Shoreline Management Act
' The DOE may veto
waters are shorelines of "state-wide significance."37

local regulations applicable to shorelines of state-wide significance and
will approve such regulations only when it determines that the local
program "provide[s] the optimum implementation of the policy of...
[the SMA] to satisfy the state-wide interest."3' The SMA also requires
the DOE and local governments to limit activities severely that increase
erosion or detrimentally alter natural conditions on these shorelines.39
Finally, the SMA acknowledges the concurrent federal role in regulating
shoreline uses and managing the coastal zone. It requires that when

"federal or interstate agency plans, activities, or procedures conflict with
state policies, all reasonable steps available shall be taken by the state to
preserve the integrity of its policies.' ' 40
2.

Locally AdministeredMasterPrograms
Under the SMA, local governments are primarily responsible for

creating and administering regulatory programs to protect shoreline
ecology. 4 City and county governments must maintain a comprehensive
inventory of the uses, projected uses, ownership patterns, and natural
characteristics of their shorelines.42 Each local government uses this data

to develop a master program43 that regulates shoreline uses consistent
with DOE guidelines.'

37. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(2)(e)(iii) (1998); see also Buechel v. Department of Ecology,
125 Wash. 2d 196, 204 n.23, 884 P.2d 910, 916 n.23 (1994) (noting that state has more planning
authority with regards to shorelines of state-wide significance).
38. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.090(2) (1998).
39. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-040(5)(c)(i) (1999).
40. Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.260 (1998).
41. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.050 (1998). See generally Wash. Admin. Code § 173-26-080
(1999) (requiring that approximately 300 local governments develop and administer shoreline m4ster
program).
42. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.080(1) (1998).
43. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(3)(b) (1998) (defining master program as "comprehensive
use plan for a described area, and the use regulations together with maps, diagrams, charts, or other
descriptive material and text, a statement of desired goals, and standards developed in accordance
with the polic y]... [of the SMA]"). See generally Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.100 (1998) (advising
that local governments and DOE utilize all available environmental information and data in creating
master program); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.120, .130 (1998) (mandating public hearings and
comment periods during master-program development).
44. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.080(2) (1998); see also Clam Shacks of Am., Inc. v. Skagit
County, 109 Wash. 2d 91, 94, 743 P.2d 265, 267 (1987).
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While the DOE mandates that local master programs include "all land
and water uses" and assessments of their impact on the environment," its
guidelines are intentionally broad to allow local governments to tailor
regulations to particular local conditions.46 The DOE and local governments must periodically review these master programs and make
necessary adjustments to accommodate changes in shoreline use.47 The
DOE has set forth twenty-one categories of shoreline
use to assist local
48
governments in preparing local master programs.
3.

The Evolution of the Scope of Shoreline Use Regulations

The regulatory breadth of the SMA has evolved to encompass most
shoreline use activities. Under the SMA, each local government
'
exclusively administers a "development" 49
permit system to regulate
°
shoreline activitiesi A local government may grant a permit only when
the proposed development is consistent with the local master program
and the policy provisions of the SMA.5 ' Furthermore, no person may
undertake a "substantial development "' on the shorelines of the state

45. Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-040 (1999).
46. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-060 (1999). For example, the City of Bainbridge Island
prohibited live-aboard vessels-vessels such as houseboats "licensed and designed for /use
as ...mobile structure[s] with adequate self-propulsion and steering equipment to be operated
as... vessel[s], but... principally used as... over-water residence[s]"-except in marinas, in
response to complaints that these vessels discharged sewage directly into city waters and generated
noise disturbing local residents. City ofBainbridge IslandShoreline Master Program, Jan. 1998, at
22, 72-73 [hereinafter Bainbridge Island Master Program]. See generally Karen Polinsky, Adrift?
State to Bainbridge: 'Live-Aboards'MustGo, The Sun (Bremerton, Wash.), June 2, 1996, at B 1.
47. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.190(1) (1998).
48. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-060. The definition of "use activities" does not include
either navigation or vessel movement. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-060.
49. A "development" is "a use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of structures;
dredging; drilling; dumping; filling; removal of any sand, gravel, or minerals; bulkheading; driving
of piling; placing of obstructions; or any project of a permanent or temporary nature which interferes
with the normal public use of the surface of the waters ....
" Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(3)(d)
(1998).
50. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.140(3) (1998).
51. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.140(2)(b) (1998); Wash. Admin. Code § 173-27-140(1) (1999).
52. A "substantial development" is any development exceeding $2500 in cost or one that
"materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state." Wash. Rev.
Code § 90.58.030(3)(e) (1998). One might argue that the erosive force of vessel wake wash removes
sand, and thus is a development. However, this argument is weak and necessitates justifying the
procedural burden of having each vessel obtain a permit from each local jurisdiction through which
it passes. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(3)(d)-(e); infra note 53 and accompanying text.

Washington Shoreline Management Act
before obtaining a local permit. 3 Any party aggrieved by a decision to
grant, deny, or rescind a permit may seek review from the Shorelines
Hearings Board, the quasi-judicial body established by the SMA. 4
Washington courts have broadly interpreted the definition of development to include shoreline uses not listed in the statute in order to uphold
local regulatory efforts."
In addition, the Supreme Court of Washington has construed the SMA
to authorize the DOE and local governments to regulate all shoreline
uses and not just statutorily defined developments. In Clam Shacks of
America, Inc. v. Skagit County,56 the plaintiff argued that because its
clam-harvesting technique was not a development, the county's
aquaculture-permit regulation exceeded the regulatory authority granted
by the SMA.57 The court disagreed and held that the SMA authorizes
local governments to regulate all shoreline uses. The court noted that
walking and fishing are not developments but are shoreline uses that may
be regulated. 9 However, while the scope of SMA regulatory authority
has evolved, no court or legislative or administrative body has explicitly
construed the SMA to authorize the regulation of vessel speed.
B.

The FederalRole in CoastalZone Management and Navigation

Although the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) articulates a national policy to protect the shoreline environment and makes
states responsible for implementing this policy, the federal government
has jurisdiction over, and a paramount interest in, navigation on the

53. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.140(2)(a) (1998).

54. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.170, .180(1) (1998). The Shorelines Hearings Board also
reviews appealed rules, regulations, or guidelines adopted or approved by the DOE. See Wash. Rev.
Code § 90.58.180(4) (1998). A party may seek review of a decision of the Shorelines Hearings
Board in superior court. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 34.05.514, 90.58.180(3) (1998); see also Wash.
Rev. Code § 34.05.526 (1998) (authorizing further appeal to Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of

Washington).
55. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721, 726-27, 592 P.2d 1108, 1112
(1979) (holding that logging-road construction includes "dumping" and "filling"); English Bay
Enters. v. Island County, 89 Wash. 2d 16, 20, 568 P.2d 783, 785 (1977) (holding that clamharvesting technique, which includes scooping up tideland material and sifting clams, is "dredging").
56. 109 Wash. 2d 91, 743 P.2d 265 (1987).
57. See id at 92, 743 P.2d at 266.

58. See id at 96-97,743 P.2d at 268-69.
59. See id at 96, 743 P.2d at 268.

527
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navigable waters 6' of the United States.6 When a vessel obtains a federal
license to engage in coastal trade, it has the right to navigate on
navigable waters within the states.62 Even when Congress, pursuant to
the Submerged Lands Act,63 granted states ownership and management
authority over the lands and natural resources beneath their navigable
waters, Congress retained federal authority to regulate navigation and to
use and control these lands and waters solely for navigational purposes.'
Similarly, while the CZMA grants states greater authority over the
coastal zone,65 it does not diminish federal jurisdiction over navigable
waters and water resources. 66
1.

The FederalCoastalZone ManagementAct of 1972

Congress enacted the CZMA 67 to address the increasing and
competing demands on the coastal zones of the United States. 68 The
CZMA strives to balance the demands of ecological, cultural, and
historical values with the needs of economic development to achieve
prudent use of land and water resources.69 In particular, Congress sought
to protect against "the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-

60. For purposes of this Comment, "navigable waters" means the waters of Puget Sound as well
as the coastal marine waters of other states. There are many definitions of navigable waters, but the
variations in these definitions are not relevant to this Comment. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty & MaritimeLaw 11-18 (2d ed. 1994).
61. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 26-27 (1824) (holding that Congress' power to
regulate navigation derives from Commerce Clause).
62. See id. at 212-13; see also Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 280 (1977). But see
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960) (holding that "mere
possession" of federal license does not immunize vessels from local police powers).
63. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994).
64. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b)(1), (d), 1314(a); see also United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32,
37 (1978) (holding Submerged Lands Act grant of authority applies to waters over submerged lands
as well as lands themselves); Douglas,431 U.S. at 284 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S.
1, 10 (1960)).
65. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
66. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1) (1994).
67. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994)). Prior to this Act there was no comprehensive federal
scheme of shoreline environmental protection.
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1451(1)(c) (1994).
69. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1994).
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rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems,
decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion."7

Through the CZMA, Congress endeavored to increase state control
over coastal land and water uses.7 "Broad opportunities" for states to
influence federal activities encourage states to voluntarily create coastal
zone management programs pursuant to the CZMA.72 The Act calls for

coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and local agencies in
coastal zone management.73 Accordingly, the CZMA does not create a
centralized federal program, but rather gives states the opportunity and
financial resources to promulgate their own coastal zone management
programs.74 Although Congress has declined to specify all of the
parameters of state management programs,75 the CZMA authorizes grants
to help states develop management programs and to help implement and
administer these programs.76 Before a state receives these funds, the
Secretary of Commerce must approve the proposed state program.77 A
state's program must define "permissible land uses and water uses within

the state's coastal zone which have a direct and significant impact on the
state's coastal waters" and address other shoreline management issues.78
At the same time, the CZMA recognizes that the activities of federal

agencies, including the Department of Transportation, within which the

70. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(I)(c). The Secretary of Commerce promulgates rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of the CZMA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1463 (1994).
71. See S. Rep. No. 92-753, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4780; see also Cape
May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1983).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1012, at 35 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4362,4383.
73. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452(5) (1994).
74. Each state's coastal zone management program is unique. States may set criteria and
standards and allow local governments to develop and implement coastal programs. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 923.42(b)(2)-(c) (1999). Washington's plan, comprised principally of the SMA, is such a plan.
Also, a state may create its coastal zone management program by networking existing statutes. See
15 C.F.R. § 923A3 (1999); see also FloridaCoastalManagement Program(visited Mar. 25, 2000)
<http.Jwww.dca.state.fl.uslffcmFCMPN/publication-information/progguide98preface.htm>
(describing Florida program as being comprised of 23 separate statutes).
75. See S. Rep. No. 92-753, at 11 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4785; see also
Murphy v. Department of Natural Resources, 837 F. Supp. 1217, 1223-24 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (noting
that Congress encouraged cooperation between local, state, and federal governments).
76. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455 (1994).
77. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2); see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454(a)-(b), 1455(d) (requiring state programs to
include identification of coastal zone, inventory and designation of areas ofparticular concern, broad
guidelines on use priorities, ways to control shoreline erosion, and other issues).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:519, 2000

Coast Guard operates, may impact a state's coastal zone.79 Thus, the Act
provides federal agencies the opportunity to participate fully in the
development and review of state coastal zone management programs.80
The Secretary of Commerce will not approve a state's program unless
the program considers the views of all relevant federal agencies."'
Similarly, if a state seeks to amend its coastal zone management program
to change substantially the uses it manages, the state must involve federal
agencies in the amendment process.82 A federal agency may delay the
approval process by contesting the proposed amendment." Once the
Secretary of Commerce approves a state's coastal zone management
program, federal agencies conducting or supporting activities affecting
that state's coastal zone must do so in a manner consistent, to the
"maximum extent practicable," with the enforceable policies of the
approved state program.'
It is important to note that initial federal approval of a state coastal zone
management program does not preclude federal preemption.85 Likewise,
when a state proposes an amendment to its coastal zone management
program, the Secretary of Commerce should approve the amendment only if
the state program remains approvable after incorporating the proposed
amendment and federal regulations do not preempt the proposed
amendment.8 6 The participation of federal agencies in the programdevelopment process helps to avoid future preemption issues.
79. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(d)(1) (1999).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1).
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (1994).
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e) (1994); 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.80(d), .81(b)(5) (1999).
83. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.83 (1999).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1994); 15 C.F.Rt § 930.30 (1999); Wash. Admin. Code § 173-27-060(1)
(1999). Thus, because the SMA largely comprises Washington's federally approved coastal zone
management program, anyone applying for a federal license or permit to conduct an activity
affecting land or water uses in Washington's coastal zone must provide documentation that the
proposed plan complies with the SMA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(a) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 930.50
(1999); Wash. Admin. Code § 173-27-060 (1999); see also Save Lake Wash. v. Frank, 641 F.2d
1330, 1337 (9thCir. 1981).
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1) (1994); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178-79
(1978) (holding that PWSA preempts several of Washington's oil tanker regulations regardless of
their inclusion in federally approved coastal zone management plan); see also Barbara Little, The
FederalConsistency Provisions ofthe CoastalZone Management Act 33-34 (1977).
86. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.82 (1999); Office of Coastal & Ocean Resource Management, National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., The CoastalZone Management Act and Changes to State and
Territory Coastal Management Programs (last modified July 1996) <http://www.nos.noaa.gov/
ocrm/pdf/prochng.pdf>. The Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, which functions
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2.

FederalRegulation of Vessels Pursuantto Title I of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act

The same year as the CZMA, Congress enacted Title I of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) s in response to safety concerns over
increasing vessel traffic."s Title I of the PWSA demands increased

supervision of vessel and port operations to ensure that vessels comply
with all applicable federal standards and to reduce the possibility of
damage to life, property, or the marine environment. 9 Title I of the
PWSA authorizes the Secretary of the department in which the Coast

Guard operates to establish, operate, and maintain measures for
controlling or supervising vessel traffic, such as routing schemes, speed,
and other operating restrictions.' When the Coast Guard promulgates
regulations pursuant to Title I of the PWSA, it must consider numerous
factors including vessel traffic, port and waterway configurations, risk of
accident, proximity of oil and gas drilling, and environmental impacts.91
However, the Coast Guard's authority to regulate pursuant to Title I of
the PWSA is discretionary.92
The Coast Guard has promulgated limited vessel-speed regulations for
Puget Sound pursuant to Title I of the PWSA. Vessels in a trafficseparation scheme93 may not exceed eleven knots when transiting areas
"where hazardous levels of vessel traffic congestion are deemed to

within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the agency within the Department of
Commerce that administers the CZMA, conducts this analysis. See id.
87. Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236
(1994)).
88. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221(b)(1994).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221(b)-(c) (1994).
90. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1222(2), 1223(a)(1), (4) (1994); see also 33 C.F.R. § 161.1 (1999).
91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1224(a) (1994); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1994) (authorizing Coast
Guard to prevent damage to any shore area immediately adjacent to navigable waters and to protect
waters and their resources from harm caused by vessels).
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1) (stating that Secretary of Transportation, acting through Coast
Guard, "may" regulate vessel traffic); see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 169-70
(1978). In contrast, Title II of the PWSA mandates that the Coast Guard regulate. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 3306(a) (1994) (stating that Secretary of Transportation "shall" establish rules and regulations for
vessel design, operation, and construction); see also United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1149
(2000).
93. See 33 C.F.R. § 167.5(a) (1999) (defining traffic-separation scheme as "designated routing
measure which is aimed at the separation of opposing streams of traffic by appropriate means and by
the establishment of traffic lanes").
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exist."94 Therefore, this speed limit applies only when, due to traffic
conditions, the Coast Guard imposes a traffic-separation scheme." In
addition, "[e]ach vessel operator is responsible for operating their vessel
at a safe speed, especially in reduced visibility, and for the wake created
by their vessel."96 Because this Comment advocates using the SMA to
regulate vessel speed in Puget Sound, the existence of these federal speed
regulations necessitates discussion of the relationship between state and
federal vessel regulations.
II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
VESSEL REGULATIONS

Judicial interpretation of the Supremacy Clause97 establishes that a
state's police power98 is limited to the extent that federal law may
preempt it. A state may use its police power to protect its shoreline
environment by regulating vessels on navigable waters. 9 Federally
certified vessels must obey "reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation
and environmental protection measures" imposed by a state."° However,

94. 33 C.F.R. § 165.1301(d) (1999); see also U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Transp., Puget
Sound Vessel Traffic Service User's Manual 3-3 (rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter Vessel Traffic Service
Manual]. Vessel operators must comply with all measures and directions established by local Vessel
Traffic Services. See 33 C.F.R. § 161.1 (1999).
95. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.1301(d).
96. Vessel Traffic Service Manual,supra note 94, at 4-3.
97. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
98. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (holding that states have regulatory power
grounded in Tenth Amendment). In the navigation context, states have historically used their police
power to protect the health and environment of their citizens. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 15
(1937); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
99. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1495
(W.D. Wash. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker
Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000).
100. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978) (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prod.,
Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 485, 493
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Alaska environmental statute prohibiting discharge of ballast in state
waters was valid exercise of state police power). Unloaded oil tankers take on seawater for ballast to
ensure submergence and vessel stability. See id. at 485. Upon arrival in port, tankers discharge
ballast before loading cargo tanks with oil. See id. Ballast held in empty oil tanks containsi oil
residue. See id.
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a federal agency such as the Coast Guard, acting through its rulemaking
process, may preempt state and local laws and regulations.1"'
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated
the preemption rule applicable to state regulations challenged under Title
I of the PWSA.'0 3 Title I of the PWSA does not preempt state regulations
premised on "the peculiarities of local waters that call for special
precautionary measures."" °4 States may adopt regulations when the Coast
Guard has neither exercised its discretionary authority to regulate
pursuant to Title I of the PWSA nor determined that no regulations are
06
necessary or appropriate. °5 Pursuant to conflict preemption analysis,
state regulations are void to the extent that compliance with both state
and federal regulations is impossible or when the state regulations
impede the purposes and objectives of Congress.1°7 In addition, the Court
has highlighted that when Congress establishes a scheme of federal-state
cooperation, courts are less likely to find that federal regulations preempt
state regulations.'" Accordingly, preemption analysis under Title I of the
PWSA preserves the "historic role" of states in regulating local waters in
"appropriate circumstances."'"°
I.

THE SMA SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO AUTHORIZE THE
REGULATION OF VESSEL SPEED IN PUGET SOUND

The text of the Shoreline Management Act (SMA) as well as judicial
and administrative interpretations of its regulatory scope demonstrate
that the Washington State Department of Ecology (DOE) and local
governments should construe the SMA to authorize the regulation of
101. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57,63-64 (1988).
102. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
103. See United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1148-49 (2000) (interpreting Ray).
104. Id at 1148 (quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 171).
105. See idL; see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 161-63.
106. In contrast, field preemption analysis applies to state regulations related to Title H of the
PWSA. See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1149 (holding that Congress has expressed intent to preclude any
state regulation of subjects covered by Title II of PWSA because of need for national uniformity);
see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 161, 179-80.
107. See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1148 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01
(1989)); see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 158; Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. I, 10 (1937);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
108. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,319-20 (1851).
109. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1148.
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vessel speed to protect the shoreline environment of Puget Sound from
high-speed-vessel wake wash. Federal congressional intent, as reflected
in the language and legislative history of the Coastal Zone Management
Act (CZMA), also suggests that the DOE and local governments may,
consistent with the CZMA, regulate vessel speed. Finally, the Secretary
of Commerce's approval of other states' coastal zone management
programs that include vessel regulations supports this conclusion.
A.

The Text of the SMA andInterpretationsof Its Scope Suggest That
the DOE and Local Governments Should Construe the SMA to
Authorize the Regulation of Vessel Speed

Although the SMA does not directly address the regulation of vessels
or navigation,"' the DOE and local governments should construe it to
authorize the regulation of vessel speed. This argument is premised on
three considerations: (1) the SMA authorizes the regulation of all water
uses in Puget Sound; (2) the DOE has demonstrated a willingness to
regulate vessels pursuant to the SMA, and the Shorelines Hearings Board
and Supreme Court of Washington have demonstrated a willingness to
uphold such regulations; and (3) the liberal-construction clause,
flexibility, and policy of the SMA all support the promulgation of local
vessel-speed regulations in Puget Sound.
1.

The DOE and Local Governments May Regulate Water Uses in
Puget Sound

The DOE and local governments should regulate vessel speed
pursuant to the SMA because a vessel's use of the waters of Puget Sound
is within the jurisdiction of the SMA.'" Under the SMA, the waters of
Puget Sound are shorelines." 2 Although neither the legislature, DOE, nor
any Washington court has directly addressed whether vessel movement
is a shoreline use, the Clam Shacks court noted that walking and fishing
are shoreline uses that may be regulated even though they are not
110. See generally Wash. Admin. Code §§ 173-27-030 to -040 (1999) (suggesting that normal
maintenance or repair of vessels requires substantial development permit).
111. See supra Part I.A.I-3. The DOE has ultimate authority over the waters of Puget Sound and
should ensure that local governments neither enact unreasonably restrictive vessel-speed regulations
nor sacrifice their shoreline environments to unfettered vessel traffic. See supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
112. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.030(2)(d) (1998).
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developments."' The Supreme Court of Washington should uphold
vessel-speed regulations because the Chinook's seventeen daily trips
through Rich Passage," 4 a water use causing erosion and ecological
damage," 5 are analogous to walking, a land use.

The Supreme Court of Hawaii's interpretation of its coastal zone
management

program" 6

exemplifies

how

the DOE

and

local

governments should construe the SMA to authorize the regulation of
vessel speed in Puget Sound. Hawaii's coastal zone management
program attempts to minimize adverse impacts to coastal ecosystems" 7

and vests significant planning and permitting authority with the county
governments."' The SMA is similarly structured." 9 In Young v. Planning
Commission, ° the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that when a
commercial vessel owner expanded his fleet of whale-watching, fishing,
and ferrying vessels, his activity was a "[c]hange in the intensity of use

of water," and thus a development that required a permit.'' Likewise, the
deployment of the Chinook has changed the intensity of the use of the
waters of Puget Sound and has caused serious ecological damage." The
Supreme Court of Washington's broad definition of shoreline uses in

Clam Shacks is analogous to the Young court's interpretation of Hawaii's
coastal zone management program." Therefore, the DOE and local
governments should follow Hawaii's example and construe the SMA to

113. See Clam Shacks of Am., Inc. v. Skagit County, 109 Wash. 2d 91, 96-97, 743 P.2d 265,
268-69 (1987); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
114. See Lange, supra note 4, at BI.
115. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.See generally Buechel v. Department of Ecology,
125 Wash. 2d 196, 210, 884 P.2d 910, 919 (1994) (holding that local governments may consider
cumulative impact of all like developments when making permit determinations). The SMA does not
distinguish between temporary and permanent shoreline uses. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 90.58.030(3)(d) (1998) (defining development as any project of permanent or temporary nature
that interferes with normal public use of surface of waters).
116. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 205A-1 to -64 (1997).
117. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 205A-2, -21.
118. See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 205A-23, -26 to -29; see also Young v. Planning Comm'n, 974 P.2d
40,42 (Haw. 1999).
119. See supra Part LA.1-3.
120. 974 P.2d 40 (Haw. 1999).
121. IM.at 49 (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 205A-22(4)). Other states in their management programs
recognize the adverse impact of vessels on the coastal zone. See, e.g., Tex. Parks & Wild. Code Ann.
§ 14.002(b)(9) (West 2000) (providing for study of boat traffic effects on sensitive wetland areas).
122. See supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 56-58, 113, and accompanying text.
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authorize the regulation of vessel speed to protect the shoreline
environment.
2.

PriorDecisions of the DOE, Shorelines HearingsBoard, and
Supreme Court of Washington Evidence That the SMA Authorizes
the Regulation of Vessel Speed

The DOE's willingness to regulate vessels pursuant to the SMA
suggests that the DOE should approve local vessel-speed regulations. In
the absence of explicit statutory language in the SMA authorizing the
regulation of vessels, the DOE's construction of the SMA should be
given deference.'24 The DOE approved"z the City of Bainbridge Island's
local master program regulation prohibiting live-aboard vessels from
anchoring in city waters, except in marinas.'26 While live-aboard vessels
are distinct from federally licensed high-speed vessels such as the
Chinook, the DOE's approval of the City of Bainbridge Island's
regulation is a liberal administrative interpretation of the SMA and
signals the DOE's willingness to approve local vessel-speed regulations
promulgated pursuant to the SMA.
In addition, decisions of the Shorelines Hearings Board-the body
charged with adjudicating disputes under the SMA' 2 7 -suggest that the
DOE and local governments should regulate vessel speed pursuant to the
SMA. The Shorelines Hearings Board's interpretation of the SMA is
entitled to due deference.' 28 First, the Board has affirmed local
development permit determinations based on the detrimental impact of
motorized vessels on the shoreline environment.'29 Second, the Board has
held that Coast Guard licensing does not exempt a vessel from local

124. See Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441, 448, 536 P.2d 157, 161
(1975) (holding that agency interpretation of ambiguous statute should be given deference).
125. In fact, the DOE insisted on this regulation. See Polinsky, supra note 46, at BI; see also
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
126. See Bainbridge Island Master Program, supra note 46, at 22, 72-73. This regulation was
affirmed on appeal. See Gilpin v. Department of Ecology, No. 97-3-0003 (Central Puget Sound
Growth Management Hearings Bd. 1997).
127. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
128. See Jefferson County v. Seattle Yacht Club, 73 Wash. App. 576, 589, 870 P.2d 987, 995
(1994).
129. See Order Denying Reconsideration, Union Bay Preservation Coalition v. Cosmos Dev. &
Admin. Corp., S.H.B. No. 92-51 (Shorelines Hearings Bd. 1994) (affirming permit conditioned on
preventing adverse impacts of motorized vessels on lily pads and fragile wetlands habitat).
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regulation pursuant to the SMA. 3° Third, the Board has concluded that
local governments may employ development permits to regulate vessel
operations.' These rulings demonstrate, the Shorelines Hearings Board's
recognition of the need to use the SMA to regulate vessels to protect the
shoreline environment.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington has interpreted the SMA
to allow the regulation of movement on the water. In dicta in Weden v.
San Juan County,32 the court reasoned that San Juan County's personal
watercraft ban 33 was consistent with the SMA because the ban protected
the shoreline environment from pollution, noise, and dangerous threats to
marine and animal life.33 Although personal watercraft are distinct from
commercial vessels, the Weden ruling evidences the court's liberal
interpretation of the SMA. This ruling and the decisions of the Shorelines
Hearings Board, approving the use of the SMA to regulate vessels
licensed by the Coast Guard, suggest that the Supreme Court of
Washington should uphold local vessel-speed regulations promulgated
pursuant to the SMA to protect shoreline ecology.
3.

The Liberal-ConstructionClause,Flexibility, andPurpose ofthe
SMA Show That the SMA Authorizes the Regulation of Vessel Speed

Several aspects of the SMA demonstrate why the DOE and local
governments should interpret the Act to authorize the regulation of vessel
speed in Puget Sound to protect shoreline ecology. First, the text of the
SMA calls for its liberal construction. Second, the flexible guidelines of
the SMA recognize that new environmental protection measures will be
necessary to account for changing shoreline uses. Third, regulating highspeed vessels pursuant to the SMA achieves its goals of protecting both
the shoreline environment and navigational rights.
130. See Final Findings of Fact at 6, Aydelotte v. Island County, S.H.B. No. 95-39 (Shorelines
Hearings Bd. July 24, 1996).
131. See Holmes Harbor Homeowners v. Nichols Bros. Boat Builders, S.H.B. No. 83-6, at 15
(Shorelines Hearings Bd. Feb. 24, 1984) (affirming conditional-use permit requiring specified times

of vessel launchings); Seattle Shorelines Coalition v. City of Seattle, S.H.B. No. 78-2, at 1, 7
(Shorelines Hearings Bd. June 28, 1978) (upholding substantial-development-permit requirement to
Coast Guard-documented barge vessel).
132. 135 Wash. 2d 678,958 P.2d 273 (1998).

133. The City of Bainbridge Island's shoreline master program, approved by the DOE, also
prohibits personal watercraft and similar recreational equipment in certain aquatic environments.
See BainbridgeIslandMasterProgram,supra note 46, at 86.
134. See Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 696,958 P.2d at 282.
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The text of the SMA mandates liberal construction of the Act to
achieve its objectives and purposes, including the objective of protecting
shoreline ecology from destructive high-speed-vessel wake wash.'3 5 In
upholding SMA jurisdiction over activities impacting the shoreline
environment, the Supreme Court of Washington has consistently relied
on this statutory directive.13 6 For example, in Clam Shacks, the court
invoked the liberal-construction clause of the SMA and concluded that
restricting local regulatory power to statutorily defined developments
would frustrate the purpose of the SMA. 37 Because the administrative
regulations of the SMA explicitly direct the DOE and local governments
to limit activities severely that increase erosion and detrimentally alter
shoreline conditions in Puget Sound, 38 the DOE and local governments
should liberally construe the SMA to allow the regulation of high-speed
vessels such as the Chinook that cause shoreline damage.
The DOE and local governments should construe the SMA to
authorize the regulation of vessel speed in Puget Sound because the
flexibility of the SMA administrative guidelines is intended both to
accommodate local environmental conditions and to allow environmental
protection to evolve with technology and science.'39 For example, the
City of Bainbridge Island largely prohibited live-aboard vessels pursuant
to its initial shoreline master program, having learned of these vessels'
adverse environmental effects."4 Similarly, the SMA directs the DOE
and local governments to review periodically their master programs to
regulate new shoreline uses and make any adjustments necessary to
advance the purpose of the SMA. 4' Because newly deployed high-speed
vessels such as the Chinook cause erosion, destroy critical shellfish and
kelp-bed habitats, and threaten recreational boaters,'4 2 the DOE and local

135. See supranotes 26-30 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Buechel v. Department of Ecology, 125 Wash. 2d 196, 203, 884 P.2d 910, 915
(1994); Weyerhauser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721, 727, 592 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1979);
English Bay Enters. v. Island County, 89 Wash. 2d 16,20, 568 P.2d 783, 786 (1977).
137. See Clam Shacks of Am., Inc. v. Skagit County, 109 Wash. 2d 91, 95, 743 P.2d 265, 268
(1987).
138. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
139. See Wash. Admin. Code § 173-16-060 (1999).
140. See Bainbridge IslandMaster Program,supra note 46, at 22, 72-73; Polinsky, supra note
46, at B I.
141. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.190 (1998).
142. See supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text.
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governments should, pursuant to the SMA, review and update master
programs to regulate this shoreline use.
Regulating vessel speed to reduce destructive wake wash in Puget
Sound advances the principal policies of the SMA by protecting both the
environment and public navigational rights."' Local vessel-speed
regulations achieve the environmental objective of the SMA by
minimizing wake wash that accelerates erosion and injures critical
marine habitats.'" These regulations do not deny navigational rights, but
rather help define the parameters of those rights. 45 In fact, these
regulations actually increase public navigational rights by preventing the
overturning of recreational boats. 1" Accordingly, local vessel-speed
regulations help achieve the twin goals of the SMA.
B.

The Languageand Legislative History of the CZMA and the
Approval of OtherStates' CoastalZone Management Programs
Reflect FederalIntentfor State Regulation ofNavigation

The text of the CZMA evidences Congress' finding that navigation
places strains on coastal lands and waters that result in adverse changes
to ecological systems such as shoreline erosion. 4 7 The ecological
damage caused by the Chinook's wake wash powerfully supports this
finding. 4 ' In addition, the Senate Commerce Committee recommended
in the legislative history to the CZMA that states include navigation as
well as ecology, erosion, 49 and other shoreline management issues in
state programs. 5 These statements evidence both Congress' awareness
of the relationship between vessel movement and environmental
protection and its intent to allow state regulation in this area.

143. See supranotes 27-30 and accompanying text.

144. See Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020 (1998) (prioritizing preservation of natural character of
shoreline on shorelines of state-wide significance); supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text.
145. See generally Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020 (approving limited reduction in navigational
rights); Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 696, 958 P.2d 273, 282 (1998) (finding

personal-watercraf ban is limited reduction in navigational rights).
146. See Implementation Plan,supra note 3, at 3-4; Foster & Lange, supra note 8, at Al; Warren,
supra note 3, at 44.
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1994).

148. See supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text.
149. The CZMA devotes particular attention to erosion control. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(I)

(1994); 15 C.F-R. §§ 923.25, .50(a)(5) (1999).
150. See S. Rep. No. 92-753, at 11 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776,4785-86.
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At least one federal court has relied on the legislative history of the
CZMA to uphold state authority to regulate navigation pursuant to a state
coastal zone management program. In Murphy v. Departmentof Natural
Resources,' the plaintiff argued that Florida exceeded its authority
pursuant to the CZMA when it, like the City of Bainbridge Island,
regulated the mooring of houseboats.'5 2 Citing the legislative history of
the CZMA, the court held that states have authority under their coastal
zone management
programs to regulate vessel movement on the surface
53
of the water.
Furthermore, by approving several state coastal zone management
programs that incorporate vessel regulations, the Secretary of Commerce,
with the Coast Guard's input," 4 has not per se precluded the DOE and
local governments from regulating vessel speed in Puget Sound pursuant
to the SMA.' For example, Florida's federally approved program
requires a "discharge officer" to be onboard any vessel with storage
capacity to carry 10,000 or more gallons of pollutant or fuel cargo
operating in state waters.'56 Alaska's federally approved coastal zone
management program incorporates a statute prohibiting tanker vessels
from discharging ballast in state waters.'5 7 The approval of these
programs by the Secretary of Commerce evidences a broad administrative interpretation of the CZMA regarding the incorporation of vessel
regulations in state programs, and thus supports the regulation of vessel
speed pursuant to the SMA' 5 8 However, the DOE and local governments
may regulate vessel speed pursuant to the SMA only if federal

151. 837 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
152. See id. at 1219.
153. See id. at 1223-24. But see People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n
v. Smith, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that although vessels used as
residences required coastal zone management program permit, issue was whether vessels were
moored for extended periods, not whether vessels were navigable).
154. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
155. In order to regulate vessel speed in Puget Sound, Washington may need to amend its
federally approved coastal zone management program. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
156. Fla. Stat. ch. 376.071 (1997).
157. See Alaska Stat. § 46.03.750 (Michie 1998); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1456(f) (1994)
(incorporating federal, state, and local regulations promulgated pursuant to Clean Water Act or
Clean Air Act into state coastal zone management program). Alaska's statute, passed pursuant to
authority delegated by the Clean Water Act, was unsuccessfully challenged in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 501 (9th Cir. 1984).
158. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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regulations do not undermine this authority by preempting state
regulations.
IV. COAST GUARD REGULATIONS SHOULD NOT PREEMPT
LOCAL VESSEL-SPEED REGULATIONS PROMULGATED
PURSUANT TO THE SMA s9
While the DOE and local governments may regulate vessel speed in
Puget Sound pursuant to Washington's police power,"6 Coast Guard
vessel-speed regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I of the PWSA
threaten to preempt these state regulations. 6' Although the Coast
Guard's regulations raise challenging questions, local vessel-speed
regulations promulgated pursuant to the SMA to protect the shoreline
environment from destructive high-speed-vessel wake wash should avoid
preemption for four reasons: (1) the environmental peculiarities of Puget
Sound demand protective measures; (2) the Coast Guard has not fully
exercised its discretionary authority to regulate vessel speed in Puget
Sound; (3) local vessel-speed regulations neither make compliance with
Coast Guard regulations impossible nor impede the purposes of those
regulations; and (4) the CZMA's vision of federal-state cooperation in

159. State regulation of vessels engaging in or impacting interstate commerce also merits dormant
commerce clause analysis. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994)
(holding dormant commerce clause limits state authority to inhibit flow of interstate commerce even
when Congress has not acted); see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960) (holding state regulation permissible in interstate commerce if it regulates evenhandedly,
serves legitimate interest, and local benefits outweigh burden on interstate commerce). The
nondiscriminatory character of local vessel-speed regulations and Washington's strong local interest
in protecting its shoreline environment, an interest trumpeted by Congress in the CZMA, evidence
that these regulations should pass dormant commerce clause scrutiny. See generally Norfolk S. Corp.
v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 407 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding state's ban on offshore solid-bulk trahsfer
facilities and finding that CZMA approval of state coastal zone management program does not
insulate state's ban of Coast Guard-approved activity from dormant commerce clause scrutiny
because Congress left competing-use decisions involving environmental protection and development

to states).
160. See supra Part II; cf Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pac. v. Department of Transp., 119
Wash. 2d 697, 700-08, 836 P.2d 823, 826-31 (1992) (holding state workplace safety regulations
not preempted as applied to vessels in Washington State Ferries fleet, even though vessels were
licensed, certified, and regulated by Coast Guard).
161. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; see also International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker
Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1490 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding that marine environmental
protection is within state police power but shipping is traditionally governed by federal law), aff'd in
part,rev'd in part sub nom. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053
(9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
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mitigates the possible preemption
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A.

The DOE andLocal Governments May Regulate Vessel Speed
Because the EnvironmentalPeculiaritiesof PugetSound Demand
Special Protection

Local vessel-speed regulations promulgated pursuant to the SMA
should avoid preemption because these regulations are tailored to the
"peculiarities" and "idiosyncratic" natural characteristics of Puget
Sound's waterways.163 Ecological sensitivity in Puget Sound consists
principally of sensitivity to vessel wake wash,'" which accelerates
erosion and threatens juvenile salmon, kelp, and shellfish habitats. 65 The
environmental damage caused by the Chinook evidences the need for
precautionary speed regulations.
Furthermore, Coast Guard regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I
of the PWSA should not preempt local vessel-speed regulations because
local speed regulations have "limited extraterritorial effect" beyond
Puget Sound and do not require permanent or burdensome adjustments to
vessels." 6 The Coast Guard's promulgation of dozens of pages of vessel
traffic regulations for distinct bodies of water recognizes the peculiar
needs of individual environments. 67 The general speed rule in Puget
Sound, making vessel operators responsible for operating their vessels at
safe speeds,'68 is inherently flexible to accommodate local conditions.
Thus, because the DOE and local governments are "more likely
competent than the federal government to tailor environmental
regulations to the ecological sensitivities" of Puget Sound,'69 local

162. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. Cf In re Cleveland Tankers, 67 F.3d 1200,
1205-06 (6th Cir. 1995) (using state and local vessel-speed regulations as basis for liability for
property damage caused by high-speed-vessel wake wash).
163. United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1148 (2000).
164. See supra note 11.
165. See supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text.
166. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1150 (stating that local rules are more justified if such rules do not affect
vessels outside of local waterway and do not burden vessels within local waterway).
167. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 165.1-.1708 (1999); see also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1851) (noting that some issues "demand diversity, which alone can meet the local
necessities of navigation").
168. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
169. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1984).
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vessel-speed regulations promulgated pursuant to the SMA should avoid
preemption.
B.

The DOE andLocal Governments May Regulate Vessel Speed
Where the Coast GuardHas Not ExercisedIts Discretionary
Authority to Do So

The DOE and local governments may promulgate speed regulations
for vessels outside of a traffic-separation scheme' in Puget Sound
because the Coast Guard has neither regulated these vessels nor stated
that no regulations are necessary.' When the Coast Guard exercises its
discretionary authority to regulate vessel speed or pronounces that no
regulation is needed, states may not regulate vessel speed.' In the
absence of Coast Guard action, states may regulate.173 Thus, the DOE
and local governments may regulate the speed of vessels outside of a
traffic-separation scheme, such as the Chinook, because the Coast
Guard's eleven-knot speed limit for vessels in a traffic-separation
scheme does not apply to these vessels.7" Moreover, the Coast Guard's
eleven-knot speed limit applies only during periods of heavy traffic
congestion.'" Thus, the eleven-knot speed limit should preclude the
DOE and local governments from regulating the speed of vessels within
a traffic-separation scheme only when there is heavy traffic congestion in
Puget Sound. This distinction, however, is currently inapposite because
the eleven-knot speed limit is already lower than the twelve-knot speed
limit considered necessary to protect ecologically7 6sensitive areas such as
Rich Passage from destructive vessel wake wash.

170. See supranote 93.
171. See generally 62 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625-26 (1997); 58 Fed. Reg. 67,988, 67,995 (1993)
(concluding that Coast Guard should exclusively regulate oil tanker vessel equipment, design, and
structure, but making no such pronouncement regarding vessel speed).
172. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 169-70 (1978); see also supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
173. See Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1994); Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d
859, 864 (9th Cir. 1991).
174. See generally supranotes 94-96 and accompanying text.
175. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.1301(d) (1999).
176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In theory, one might argue that the current elevenknot speed limit for vessels in a traffic-separation scheme should simply apply to all vessels.
However, this Comment contends that the DOE and local governments have both the authority and
local interest to protect particular shoreline environments from navigation's adverse effects.
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Coast GuardRegulations Should Not PreemptLocal Vessel-Speed
Regulations PromulgatedPursuantto the SMA Because the Two,
Do Not Conflict

Pursuant to the SMA, the DOE and local governments may regulate
vessel speed based on the peculiar environmental needs of Puget Sound
unless the conflict between local regulations and federal regulations is so
direct that compliance with both regulations is a "physical impossibility""' or local regulations impede the purposes of Congress.'78 As
discussed above, the DOE and local governments may regulate the speed
of vessels that do not participate in a traffic-separation scheme because
these vessels are subject to no specific speed rules with which local
speed regulations might conflict.'79
In theory it may be impossible for vessels operating within a trafficseparation scheme during periods of heavy traffic congestion to comply
with both sets of speed regulations if the local speed regulation is lower.
Yet, when a state standard is stricter than the federal standard,
compliance with the federal standard is not necessarily a physical
impossibility. 8 Federal courts have upheld vessel regulations included
in a state's coastal zone management program even when these
regulations appeared to make compliance with Coast Guard regulations
impossible. 8' For example, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond,8 2 the
Ninth Circuit upheld Alaska's ban on ballast discharge despite Coast
Guard approval of such activity in controlled circumstances. 3 Likewise,
in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly,'"' although the Coast Guard
permitted vessel-to-vessel coal exchange in Delaware Bay, the court
upheld the state's determination that such activity was banned under the

177. Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)).
178. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1148 (2000) (quoting California v. ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989)); see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 158; Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss
Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
179. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
180. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
181. In the present context, a state regulation that erodes a federal right granted by Coast Guard
regulations may be construed as making compliance with both regulations impossible.
182. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
183. See id. at 500 (noting that while regulations may be financially burdensome and demand
restructuring of vessels, burden does not justify finding of preemption).
184. 594 F. Supp. 514 (D. Del. 1984).

Washington Shoreline Management Act

state coastal zone management plan.185 These holdings illustrate that
more stringent vessel-speed regulations promulgated by the DOE and
local governments may be applicable to all vessels, including those
currently subject to the Coast Guard's eleven-knot speed limit.
Finally, local vessel-speed regulations should avoid preemption if they
do not frustrate the Coast Guard's objectives pursuant to Title I of the
PWSA.'86 The Coast Guard considers myriad factors in establishing local
speed rules, including traffic safety, maneuverability, and volume, as
well as the types, costs, and convenience of commercial vessels and their
cargoes.' 87 While the Coast Guard generally considers environmental
impacts when promulgating vessel traffic rules, 8 these rules fail to
address the cumulative ecological impacts of wake wash from routine
vessel operations. 89 In fact, the Coast Guard expressly considers traffic
congestion and the danger of vessel collisions, not the needs of shoreline
ecology, when it institutes the eleven-knot speed limit in Puget Sound. 90
Nevertheless, local vessel-speed regulations must not thwart the Coast
Guard's objectives by causing traffic congestion and safety hazards when
applied to vessels, particularly vessels in a traffic-separation scheme
subject to the current eleven-knot speed limit. 9'
D.

The CZMA's Vision ofFederal-StateCooperation Weighs Against
Preemption ofLocal Vessel-speedRegulations Promulgated
Pursuantto the SMA

Vessel-speed regulations promulgated by the DOE and local
governments pursuant to the SMA should avoid preemption because the
CZMA is a scheme of federal-state cooperation that delegates authority
to states to carry out federal congressional environmental policy
185. See id. at 516-18; see also Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1252 (D. Del.
1986), affId, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987).
186. See supra Part LB.2; supra note 107 and accompanying text.

187. See 33 U.S.C. § 1224(a) (1994).
188. See 33 U.S.C. § 1224 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 161.1(a) (1999).

189. See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 177.07(0, .08 (1999) (regulating wake wave height in certain
areas to mitigate impact of vessel wake wash, but not applying to federally licensed vessels in Puget
Sound).
190. See 33 C.F.R. § 165.1301(d) (1999); see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
191. See generally City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627-28, 637
(1973) (holding that city ordinance seeking to reduce noise pollution by disallowing jet aircraft from
leaving airport at night is preempted because it increases air-traffic congestion, impairs safety, and
frustrates objectives of Federal Aviation Administration).
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mandates. 9 2 Courts are hesitant to preempt local regulations promulgated
pursuant to a scheme of federal-state cooperation.'93 For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a city's emissions ordinance that effectively
required the Coast Guard to redefine its boiler standards because the city
acted pursuant to federal legislation granting states authority and funding
to control air pollution."9 Similarly, in Chevron, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Alaska's ballast-discharge prohibition, even though it conflicted with
Coast Guard regulations, because the state acted pursuant to the Clean
Water Act. 95 Therefore, the DOE and local governments may work
toward the federal congressional goal of protecting shoreline ecology
from the impacts of navigation by participating in the cooperative
scheme 6 of the CZMA and regulating vessel speed pursuant to the
19
SMA.

Furthermore, the consistency provision'97 of the CZMA weighs
against preemption198 by facilitating the common environmental
protection goals of the SMA, CZMA, and Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
may contend that restructuring its licensing procedures 99 to conform
with more stringent vessel-speed regulations in each state's coastal zone
management program would be so burdensome as to impair its objectives
pursuant to Title I of the PWSA. 20' However, Title I of the PWSA
recognizes the Coast Guard's role in protecting the coastal environment
from the adverse effects of navigation. 2°' Therefore, by protecting
shoreline ecology from destructive high-speed-vessel wake wash, local
vessel-speed regulations promulgated pursuant to state coastal zone
management programs such as the SMA enable the Coast Guard to
achieve more fully its regulatory objectives.

192. See generallysupra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
193. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332; Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319-20 (1851).
194. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,445-46 (1960).
195. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 484
(9th Cir. 1984).
196. See supra Part I.B.2; supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part IV.C; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1994); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a)-(d),
1223(a), 1224(a) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 930.50 (1999).
201. See 33 U.S.C. § 122 1(d), 1223(a).
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V.

CONCLUSION

As the Puget Sound region grows, Washington must balance
economic development and environmental protection. The deployment of
high-speed vessels such as the Chinook manifests the tension between
these goals. To protect the shorelines of Puget Sound from destructive
vessel wake wash, the DOE and local governments should construe the
SMA to authorize the regulation of vessel speed. The text of the SMA
and interpretations of its scope, the language and legislative history of
the CZMA, and other states' regulation of vessels pursuant to their
coastal zone management programs support this construction of the
SMA. Moreover, federal preemption rules protecting states' interests in
fulfilling peculiar environmental needs suggest that local vessel-speed
regulations promulgated pursuant to the SMA should avoid preemption.
While Washingtonians may pursue compensation for property damage
caused by high-speed-vessel wake wash, the shoreline ecology of Puget
Sound may never recover. Whether local communities choose to enjoy
the convenience and investment created by high-speed vessels or to slow
these vessels until naval architects better learn to mitigate wake wash, the
DOE is ultimately responsible for protecting the fragile ecological
resources of Puget Sound. Therefore, the DOE and local communities
should enter into this dialogue pursuant to the state environmental
protection legislation enacted for precisely this purpose.
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